Abstract-Stable games [1] have the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many learning dynamics. We show that stable games can be formulated as passive input-output systems. This observation enables us to identify passivity of a learning dynamic as a sufficient condition for global convergence in stable games. Notably, dynamics satisfying our condition need not exhibit positive correlation between the payoffs and their directions of motion. Our condition is satisfied by the dynamics known to exhibit global convergence in stable games. We give a decision-theoretic interpretation for passive learning dynamics that mirrors the interpretation of stable games as strategic environments exhibiting self-defeating externalities. Lastly, we exploit the flexibility of the passivity condition to study the impact of applying various forecasting heuristics to the payoffs used in the learning process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the oldest problems for game theory is the question of what, if anything, is the correct solution concept. The stock answer, Nash equilibrium, has well-documented difficulties. While existence is generally not an issue so long as we allow for mixed strategies, uniqueness can rarely be guaranteed. A common approach to identifying the "correct" prediction has been to analyze dynamic system models intended to mimic the decision making processes of the players. This bottom-up approach is often referred to as evolutionary game theory, or, learning in games. The procedure entails selecting an appropriate "evolutionary dynamic" (behavioral rule) and proceeding to analyze the action trajectories that the game induces, which often converge to Nash equilibria. The choice of dynamic is normally based on exogenous considerations. In particular, the most well-studied dynamic, the replicator dynamic [2] , is inspired by biological evolution. A full taxonomy of evolutionary dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper. For a thorough background on evolutionary game theory, the reader is advised to consult the many monographs on the subject. In particular, we will mostly follow the terminology and notation of [3] .
Unfortunately, evolutionary game theory frequently fails to provide much additional clarity because oftentimes the evolutionary dynamic of interest for a game under study will not induce any stable fixed points, and may even exhibit chaos [4] . In fact, games have been constructed that can be shown to never exhibit stable Nash equilibria under only very mild conditions on the dynamics themselves [5] . Thus, from a worst-case perspective, evolutionary game theory has fundamental explanatory limitations. Nonetheless, the situation is often much better. In recent decades, researchers have sought to identify broad classes of games for which correspondingly broad classes of dynamics converge to equilibrium, most notably, potential games [6] . We focus here on the recently proposed notion of a stable game [1] -a generalization of a number of earlier ideas including concave potential games, symmetric normal form games with an interior ESS, zero sum games and multi zero sum games. The appealing property of stable games is that their Nash equilibria comprise a convex set that many dynamics are guaranteed to reach [1] .
In this paper, we show that stable games can be formulated as passive input-output systems. Passivity is an abstraction of energy conservation and dissipation in mechanical and electrical systems [7] that has become a standard tool in the design and analysis of nonlinear systems [10] . It provides conditions under which particular system interconnections will be stable. After we identify stable games as passive systems, we are guaranteed that play by any admissible passive learning dynamic will admit globally asymptotically stable equilibria. It turns out that latter requirement is not especially restrictive as we show that the dynamics that guarantee global convergence in stable games are indeed passive.
An immediate benefit of our characterization, beyond providing a sufficient condition for stability, is the novel generalizations it enables. Evolutionary game theory has historically placed particular emphasis on the study of memoryless, or "one-shot" games and the dynamical systems induced by play according to learning dynamics with order equal to the total number of strategies across all players. While our definitions include this setting, they are not restricted to it. Dynamic learning schemes that utilize additional, auxiliary states in reckoning strategy changes can also be analyzed using passivity. In particular, we identify games that preserve the convergence properties of passive learning dynamics when they are combined with prevalent forecasting heuristics like smoothing and trend following Passivity techniques have been used in the analysis of game theoretic learning dynamics employed in certain specific engineering models [12] , [13] , but the notion of passivity capturing a class of dynamics or games is novel as far as we know.
II. BACKGROUND A. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Let P = {1, 2, ..., p} be a society comprised of p ≥ 1 populations. We think of each population p as a continuum of agents having mass m p . We can informally think of an individual agent as an infinitesimal in one of the populations. Each population p has a set of available strategies S p = {1, 2, ..., n p }. The total number of strategies is denoted n = p∈P n p . The set of strategy distributions for population p
we understand x p i ∈ R + as the mass of players in p utilizing strategy i ∈ S p . The product X = p∈P X p is the set of social states.
In this paper we will insist that the population masses remain constant. This implies that for
Thus admissible changes in strategy are restricted to the tangent space
Similarly, changes in social state are confined to T X = p∈P T X p . We denote the orthogonal projection onto T X as Φ.
The payoff function F : X → R n is a continuous map associating each social state with a payoff vector so that F p i : X → R is the payoff to strategy i ∈ S p . We will often assume X to be fixed and refer to F itself as the game.
A state x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, denoted x ∈ NE(F ) if each strategy in the support of x receives the maximum payoff available to its population, i.e.
We next give a formal definition of deterministic evolutionary dynamics. Define sets F and T as follows:
A deterministic evolutionary dynamic is a set valued map D : F → T that assigns each population game F ∈ F a set D(F ) ⊂ T such that for each ζ ∈ X, there is a trajectory {x(t)} t≥0 ∈ D(F ) with x(0) = ζ. We will pay special attention to evolutionary dynamics specified by the initial value problem,
which we will call traditional learning dynamics.
B. Stable Games
We say that F : X → R n is a stable game if
For a detailed discussion of stable games, see [1] . Many evolutionary dynamics are quite well-behaved when restricted to the stable games. The primary intent of this paper is to further formalize this observation. The above definition has an intuitive interpretation when F is continuously differentiable. Theorem 2.1: [1] Suppose the population game F is C 1 , then F is a stable game if and only if DF (x) is negative semidefinite with respect to T X for all x ∈ X.
We say that such an F satisfies self-defeating externalities. That is, the payoff improvements to strategies being switched to are dominated by the payoff improvements to strategies being abandoned. This is easy to see by letting z = e p j −e p i ∈ T X, the difference between two unit vectors, and noting that (by definition) z DF (x)z ≤ 0. This implies that
∂z , as required. Many games are known to be stable games. For a thorough list consult [1] and [14] . We point out only a couple examples here.
Example 1: Concave potential games Suppose that F : X → R n satisfies ∇f = ΦF for some function f : X → R. Then we call F a potential game and f its potential function. If, in addition, f is concave, then we say that F is a concave potential game. Concave potential games are stable games, as can be seen from
where the second equality follows from symmetry of the projection matrix Φ.
Example 2: Congestion games An important subclass of concave potential games are congestion games with increasing costs. These games model allocation of resources among selfish users under inelastic demand. Later on we will present some new results for this specific class, so we review the definitions here. Congestion games were originally proposed in [15] . The form we study is that described in [18] . We begin with a finite set Ψ of facilities. For each p ∈ P there is a set S p of subsets of Ψ-these are the strategies available to users in that population. Thus for each facility φ ∈ Ψ we define the utilization level
where a s,φ is the consumption rate of users of strategy s with respect to facility φ. Each facility has a non-decreasing cost function c φ : R + → R. The payoff function for strategy s ∈ S p is given by
The payoffs can be more compactly represented as
where U ∈ R |Ψ|×n is a utilization matrix satisfying (U x) φ = u φ (x) and
It follows that
The stable game property of congestion games can also be demonstrated by showing that congestion games are concave potential games. We provide this derivation in order to note that in the case that the cost functions are strictly increasing, DF (x) is negative definite for almost all utilization matrices. However, we note that in some formulations the a s,φ are assumed to all be equal to one, in which case there are only finitely many U and some of them may not be full rank.
We will see that the stable games can be formulated as passive systems.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We can represent a C 1 population game F as an inputoutput system,ẋ = u y =π = DF (x)u, which we refer to as the game subsystem induced by F . Traditionally, we think of games as memoryless mappings from strategy x to payoff F (x). This alternative description is for mathematical convenience. We will thus think of games as mappings from strategy trajectories to payoff trajectories. Given an initial condition, x 0 , any admissible, differentiable trajectoryẋ can be "fed" into the game as an input u. By admissibility we refer to the requirement that
The outputπ is then just the instantaneous time derivative of payoff. The actual payoff can be recovered by integrating and adding in the initial condition:
In order to extend passivity to a system of this form we need to precisely define the admissible inputs and similarly define passivity relative to those inputs.
A. M-passivity
We will see that stable games and certain learning dynamics exhibit a form of passivity for systems with compact state spaces. We start with M ⊂ R n and consider the input-output systemż
where the function f : R q × R p → R q is locally Lipschitz (i.e. Lipschitz when restricted to any compact set) and h :
, the set of continuous functions mapping [0, ∞) to R p and define an input space
where {z(t)} t≥0 is the solution to the initial value problem (1) with z(0) = z 0 and is assumed to be unique. These are the inputs that keep the state of the system in M when the system is initialized at z 0 = v. 
Then we say that the system is M-passive if σ = 1 and M-anti-passive if σ = −1. If the inequality (2) is strict for z(t) / ∈ A then the system is strictly M-passive if σ = 1 and strictly M-anti-passive if σ = −1. We will make extensive use of the following.
Theorem
The proof of 3.1 uses standard Lyapunov arguments pertaining to stability of compact sets, such as those found in [19] . The existence of the compact set Γ(Ω) is nearly immediate when dealing with traditional game and dynamics subsystems.
Consider the positive-feedback interconnection of two systems (f 1 , h 1 ) and (f 2 , h 2 ) that are, respectively, M 1 -anti-passive with storage function L 1 and M 2 -passive with storage function L 2 . More precisely, we define the inputs to the two systems as
We will assume that these equations have unique solutions for every (z 1 , z 2 , u 1 , u 2 ). This implies an overall state model:
, and y = y 1 y 2 .
The functions f and h inherit the smoothness properties of f i and h i . In order to extend M-passivity to the interconnection in a meaningful way, we must identify a non-empty set M 12 ⊂ M 1 × M 2 so that, for the overall system, 0 ∈ U M12 (v) for all v ∈ M 12 .
Theorem 3.2: The positive-feedback interconnection of two systems that are, respectively, M 1 -passive with storage function L 1 and M 2 -passive with storage function L 2 , is M 12 -passive with storage function
The proof is nearly identical to that of the classical passivity theorem. Theorem 3.1 can then be used to establish stability properties, the key point being recognition of L 12 (z 1 , z 2 ) as the appropriate Lyapunov function. The next section illustrates how our definitions accommodate stable games.
B. Passive systems induced by games
The definitions of the last section can be applied to the input-output representation of a population game. Theorem 3.3: Game subsystems induced by stable games are X-anti-passive with storage function 0.
Proof: Sinceπ = DF (x)ẋ, we have thaṫ π ẋ =ẋ (DF (x)) ẋ ≤ 0, which implies 0 ≤ −π ẋ = −u y.
We note here that DF (x) is not defined for social states x / ∈ X. It follows that the only allowed inputs u =ẋ are those that that keep x in X. This is captured in the definition of X-anti-passivity.
C. Passive Dynamics
We can similarly formulate an evolutionary dynamicẋ = V F (x) as an input-output system.
whereẋ is understood as the time-derivative of the social state x and the definition of the system output. The social state x appears in both the learning and game subsystems. Abusing notation slightly, we use the subscripted variables x G and x D to distinguish the two. It is easy to see that the positive interconnection of the input-output systems associated with the game and learning dynamics recovers exactly the traditional differential equation as long as we initialize x G (0) = x D (0) = x 0 , and π(0) = F (x 0 ), Indeed, plugging in for the inputs u in the learning dynamics and game equations givesπ
but since π(0) = F (x 0 ) this implies π(t) = F (x(t)) for all t so that we have simplyẋ = V F (x), as required. However, we have transformed an ordinary differential equation system of order n to an interconnection of a system having order n with a system having order 2n. We reiterate that for C 1 games and traditional learning dynamics this formulation is equivalent to the traditional one under the natural initialization. We will refer to the procedure just utilized as the natural dimensional reduction.
We seek passive (i.e. R n × X-passive) dynamics that produce outputsẋ ∈ U X (x 0 ). We do not need to restrict the inputs (π) to the dynamics in any way. The restrictioṅ x ∈ U X (x 0 ) is needed to ensure that interconnection with the game is meaningful, i.e. that we do not produce outputs that, when input to the game subsystem, produce motion out of X. We consider dynamics specified by revision protocols
Thus we can regard ρ p ij (π p , x p ) as the switch rate from strategy i ∈ S p to strategy j ∈ S p . Our first example is the excess payoff target (EPT) dynamics. EPT dynamics have revision protocols of the form
is the vector of excess payoffs. In this case the dynamics take the simpler forṁ
The EPT dynamics include best response 1 , logit, and Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics. Clearly EPT dynamics always guaranteeẋ ∈ U X (x 0 ). We say that τ p is separable if τ
We assume that τ p is Lipschitz continuous. The prototype of this subset of the EPT dynamics is the Brown-von NeumannNash dynamic, with τ
In the theorem that follows, we treat EPT dynamics as input-output systems fromπ toẋ, as explained above. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.1 in [1] .
Theorem 3.4: Seperable, acute EPT dynamics are strictly R n × X-passive with storage function
The next section combines the results of the previous two sections to recover the known convergence properties of separable, acute EPT dynamics in stable games.
D. Interconnections
In order to realize traditional games/dynamics we restrict ourselves to initializations that assign the same strategy distributions to both the game and dynamics subsystems. The payoffs, residing only in the dynamics subsystem, are initialized so as to match the initial strategy distribution. Formally, we consider initializations from the invariant set
Combining the storage functions of stable games and separable, acute EPT dynamics restricted to the proposed invariant set and applying the natural dimensional reduction gives zero level set for the combined storage function
corresponding to precisely the set of Nash equilibria of the stable game. Theorems 3.1 -3.4 provide an alternative proof of the following known result, reworded below. Theorem 3.5: [1] The positive-feedback interconnection of a C 1 stable game F and separable, acute EPT dynamics admits the globally asymptotically stable set NE(F ).
The advantage of the present formulation is that the passivity inequality gives a sufficient condition for converge to equilibrium in stable games. In particular we see that positive correlation need not be satisfied. Instead, we check the correlation between the inner product of the time derivative termsẋ andπ. Indeed it had already been shown that positive correlation in an excess payoff dynamic not satsifying integrability could lead to cycling in some stable games [1] . In addition, the perturbed best response dynamics, a class of dynamics not satisfying positive correlation, do achieve global convergence in stable games [11] . Passivity of perturbed best response dynamics, as well as a third family of dynamics known as pairwise comparison dynamics [20] can be demonstrated, but we do not do so here in the interest of brevity. Next, We offer a decision theoretic interpretation of the passivity inequality for the learning subsystem. We borrow from the game theoretic interpretation of stable games.
E. Interpreting the passivity inequality
EPT (0) reveals the basic action of the EPT dynamics. In essence, EPT dynamics act as a greedy optimizer. If no exogenous input is supplied (i.e.π = 0), then EPT dynamics will eventually ensure that only strategies enjoying maximum payoff among their population will be utilized. The passivity of EPT dynamics did not make any assumptions onπ. In particular,π need not be generated from interconnection with a game. We will exploit this property later by generalizing the game subsystem.
The passivity inequality for the EPT dynamics can be given an interpretation that borrows from the interpretation proposed for stable games. At L −1 EPT (0), all populations are content. We can thus think of L EPT as a metric of discontent, although obviously it is not a true metric. The passivity inequality says that the growth rate of agents' discontent is always less than the instantaneous self-enforcing externalities,ẋ π. These are the negative of self-defeating externalities. This guarantee is independent of the procedure generatingπ. If the source ofπ is interconnection with a stable game, then instantaneous self-enforcing externalities are zero and so our metric of discontent does not grow at all!
The next section suggests some new learning dynamics whose analysis is aided by our definitions.
IV. DYNAMIC LEARNING
In this section we consider learning dynamics that are less myopic than traditional learning dynamics like EPT. In particular, we examine the consequences of players' utilizing either smoothed versions of the payoffs, or payoffs augmented with an additive term that approximates the time-derivative of the payoffs. Each of these modifications captures the application of some form of forecasting heuristic to the payoffs. With obvious caveats, we propose that these learning dynamics approximate the way human cognition attempts to extract regularities from data. In each case we show that for games having affine payoffs F (x) = Ax + b, with A negative definite, neither anticipation or smoothing have any consequences for global stability of passive learning dynamics. The prototype for this class of games is congestion games with affine, strictly increasing costs and non-singular utilization matrices.
A potential source of confusion is that we will be analyzing the properties of subsystems we had previously identified with the "game". This is for mathematical convenience. The dynamic learning rules are arrived at by applying a standard learning dynamic (e.g. EPT) to modified payoffsπ. Our approach is to derive passivity results for modified "game" subsystems that map action trajectories to modified payoff trajectories. Interconnection with a passive learning dynamic then implies convergence results. Thus the problem of finding a class of games for which dynamic learning rules are well behaved can be cast as the problem of finding games that induce modified subsystems that are passive.
A. Smoothed learning
Suppose that F (x) = Ax+b, then we define the smoothed learning subsystem induced by F aṡ π = Au y =π = (π −π).
The termẋ = u is no longer needed because DF (x) = A is now independent of x. The operational payoffsπ track the usual payoffs π, reflecting a state of affairs in which players utilize smoothed versions of a nominal payoff stream. Given a nominal payoff stream π(t), t ≥ 0, the smoothed payoffs are given bỹ
The operational payoffπ is an exponentially weighted moving average of π with smoothing factor > 0. These sort of moving averages are naive yet popular heuristics used to smooth out short term fluctuations in order to isolate longer term trends. Alternatively, smoothing may be unavoidable when the players can only process information subject to bandwidth limitations. For games with A < 0 we find that this form of payoff smoothing admits passive systems.
Theorem 4.1: Let F (x) = Ax+b with A negative definite. Then the smoothed learning subsystem induced by F is strictly R 2n -anti-passive with storage function
having zero level set {(π,π) ∈ R 2n : π =π}. An immediate corollary of Theorem 4.1 is that any learning dynamic obtained from an admissible passive dynamic with smooth measurement of payoffs has a stable equilibrium. Indeed, for the standard dynamics we have studied global asymptotic stability of the applicable equilibrium set is guaranteed.
Theorem 4.2: Let F = Ax + b with A < 0 and consider the interconnection of the smoothed learning subsystem induced by F and either separable, acute EPT dynamics or impartial paiwise comparison dynamics. Then initializations from the invariant set
admit, using the natural dimensional reduction, the globally asymptotically stable set NE(F ).
An analogous result can be developed for other passive dynamics such as perturbed best response dynamics. To avoid redundancy, we will avoid providing any more arguments of this form. Instead we will stop at demonstrating passivity of the subsystems we study, with the understanding that stability results can then be easily verified. We next consider anticipatory learning.
B. Anticipatory learning
Consider the following dynamic system, induced by an affine game F (x) = Ax + b. π = Au λ = (π − λ) y =π =π + γ˙λ = A(1 + γ )u − γ 2 (π − λ).
We call this the anticipatory learning subsystem induced by F . The intention is that players respond to an augmented payoffπ = π + γω, where ω is an estimate ofπ and γ > 0 is the relative weight given to ω. In the system above, the quantityλ provides the estimate ofπ via an approximate differentiator. The fidelity of the approximation is controlled by > 0, with larger values providing better estimates. The concept of anticipatory learning was introduced in [21] , and is inspired by classical methods in automatic control as well as the psychological tendency to extrapolate from past trends. In [21] , players are able to observe their opponents' strategies and then use anticipatory learning to estimate their opponents' future strategy. The players then respond according to either fictitious play or gradient play. Here, we do not presume that players can observe their opponents' actions. The players use anticipatory learning to produce estimates of future payoffs. We study the stability properties of the overall system obtained when players respond to the augmented payoffs using passive dynamics.
For affine games with A negative definite, we find that anticipatory learning has no consequences for passive dynamics. 4 + 2γ (π − λ) A −1 (π − λ), having zero level set {(π, λ) ∈ R 2n : π = λ}. The storage function L al is valid for any γ, > 0, so that passivity is guaranteed regardless of the weight given to the approximate derivative or the fidelity of the approximation.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One issue in particular remains open-the status of the replicator dynamics. The Lyapunov function typically employed for replicator dynamics in stable games is the KL divergence between the current social state and the social state at equilibrium. Our framework does not allow the storage function of the learning subsystem to exploit properties of an underlying game structure.
